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‘Your kidney for an iPad’ 
Advertisement slogan used by a Chinese kidney broker 
Denis Campbell & Nicola Davison (2012)
Suppose your kidneys are failing. You might die before a donor kidney 
becomes available. If you are rich, there is a solution: buy a kidney 
on the black market in China, India or Pakistan. The kidney will cost 
you about $200.000, of which the donor will receive only $5.000. The 
remaining $195.000 will go to the broker and the surgeon who made 
the transplant happen (Ibid.). Many of us think a competitive market 
in human kidneys would be troubling. This unease is reflected in the 
prohibition of kidney trade all around the world – except in Iran.
 In Why some things should not be for sale, Debra Satz (2010) takes a 
critical look at markets that strike us as ‘noxious’ - markets that cause 
widespread discomfort or even revulsion (Ibid.: 3). She argues that 
most of these markets undermine our capacity to interact as equals. 
To guide discussions on the morality of markets, she develops a frame-
work with four parameters that proxy for lacks in relational equality. 
These parameters are (1) weak agency, (2) extreme vulnerability, (3) 
extremely harmful outcomes to individuals, and (4) extremely harmful 
outcomes to society. A market that scores high on one or a few of these 
parameters can be deemed noxious. 
 Satz’s framework backs our intuition that a competitive market in 
human kidneys is noxious (Ibid.: 204). This market would score high 
on all four parameters. People who sell a kidney are typically unaware of 
the long-term health risks of doing so (weak agency) and they are likely 
to be destitute (extreme vulnerability). Kidneys could turn into debt 
collateral, making it harder for people who do not want to sell a kidney 
to get loans (extremely harmful outcome to individuals).1 Finally, a 
kidney market could worsen existing class inequalities because only the 
rich would be able to buy kidneys and the poor would be supplying 
them (extremely harmful outcome to society).  
 Satz stresses that her framework is not intended as a blueprint that 
can be used to instantly recognize noxious markets. Users of her frame-
work may have different opinions on the relative importance of the 
parameters and how high a market would need to score on them to 
label it ‘noxious’. The project of this paper is to assess to what extent 
Satz’s framework can be used as a guide for discussions on the morality 
of markets.  
 After starting off with a brief survey of Satz’s moral limits to market 
theory, I will raise three issues. Firstly, since weak agency and extreme 
vulnerability occur often and do not always render a market noxious, 
it is not clear how these two parameters of Satz’s framework could 
distinguish between markets that are problematic and markets that 
are not. Secondly, as the moral permissibility of markets depends to a 
large extent on how they are regulated, theoretical markets can only be 
assessed with a clearly specified regulatory framework in mind. Thirdly, 
it is very important to consider all available actual results of markets, 
as markets might turn out very differently in reality than they look on 
paper. 
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2. Satz’s Moral Limits to Markets Theory 
Satz (2010: 11) wrote her book for both theoretical and practical 
purposes. Her theoretical aim is to contribute a new perspective to dis-
cussions on equality by answering the questions what type of equality is 
important? and how should this equality be achieved? On a more practical 
level, she wishes to develop a framework that can be used to structure 
debates on the moral status of markets. This section briefly outlines 
Satz’s theoretical contribution and her framework.  
The theory
To see clearly what is novel about Satz’s moral limits to markets theory, it 
is helpful to think about a competitive market in human kidneys again. 
According to Satz (Ibid.: 66), there are two important strands in the litera-
ture on equality that could help us to answer the question why this market 
is problematic: general egalitarianism and specific egalitarianism. 
 General egalitarians argue that markets may generate levels of social 
inequality that are unacceptable (Ibid.: 76). For them, a market in 
human kidneys would be problematic because it generates large ine-
qualities: the rich will live longer because they are able to buy kidneys 
from the desperately poor. Banning the market would be inefficient, as 
competitive markets generate optimal economic results (Ibid.: 77). The 
solution is to reduce the inequality produced by the market through 
income redistribution. 
 A specific egalitarian on the other hand, claims that some goods 
should be distributed more equally than others (Ibid.: 79). Some spe-
cific egalitarians (for instance Michael Waltzer) even argue that certain 
goods should not be distributed by the market system at all, because 
selling them would degrade their meaning. Examples of such goods 
would be friendship, votes and Nobel Prizes. An argument that some 
specific egalitarians could make against a market in kidneys is that the 
human body and its constituent parts should not be commodified.  
 Satz thinks that general and specific egalitarians do not sufficiently 
consider the effects that markets have on the way people in a society 
relate to each other.2  To understand how markets and social structures 
are intertwined, she argues that we need to return to the works of clas-
sical political economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Karl 
Marx (Ibid.: 57). 
 According to them, markets can only function when they are socially 
embedded. To give one example, without the social institution of a legal 
system, the power of employers over employees would be potentially 
unlimited. If people could be enslaved or imprisoned by their employ-
ers, a competitive market in labor would be hampered (Ibid.: 43). Also, 
some markets shape us more than other markets (Ibid.: 40). Especially 
the labor market has a considerable impact on the types of persons we 
become.3  Sewing the same clothes in a sweatshop for fourteen hours a 
day, seven days a week could make a person passive and even servile – 
little more than an obedient appendix to the sewing machine. 
 The lesson we can learn from classical political economists is that 
markets shape the types of persons we are and the way we relate to 
each other. This is where Satz’s concept of relational equality becomes 
important. She argues that because markets can shape the relations we 
have with each other, they can also undermine the conditions necessary 
for citizens in a society to ‘interact as equals’ (Ibid.: 95) and ‘participate 
competently and meaningfully in democratic self-governance’ (Ibid.: 
101). ‘Interacting as equals’ here means that individuals do not have to 
beg or push others around to be able to make claims on one another. In 
most markets that we consider problematic, individuals do not interact 
as equals: there is a lack of equality of standing between parties before, 
during or after transactions take place (Ibid.: 93). 
 Satz takes a broader perspective than the general egalitarian: the 
problem with noxious markets is not only that they reinforce inequa-
lities in income and wealth between the parties. Nor does she contest 
the claim made by specific egalitarians that certain goods cannot be sold 
because this would somehow degrade their meaning. The real problem 
for her is that some markets aggravate and perpetuate inequalities in 
background knowledge, level of education, social relations, and so on 
between their participants (Ibid.: 101). 
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The framework
To facilitate the discussion on whether a particular market is noxious 
or not, Satz develops a framework with four parameters that proxy for 
lacks in relational equality. Two of these parameters deal with the conse-
quences of markets, the other two with their sources. A market is noxious 
when it scores high on one or more of the four parameters. 
 Satz takes extremely harmful outcomes to individuals to be out-
comes that leave their basic interests unsatisfied. These basic interests 
refer to what is necessary to have a ‘minimally decent’ life (Ibid.: 95). 
An example of such a harmful outcome would be a stock market crash 
that completely evaporates someone’s savings. Markets can also have 
extremely harmful outcomes to society. These occur whenever markets 
undermine the possibility for individuals to interact as equals (Ibid.: 
95). Consider child labor. Children from poorer backgrounds will, on 
average, have to work more and will receive less education than chil-
dren of richer parents. This way, the inequality in education level and 
income in a society is passed on from parents to the next generation. 
 Now, on to the source parameters. There is weak agency in a mar-
ket whenever agents are not completely aware of the consequences of 
an action, or do not have full information about the good that is being 
exchanged (Ibid.: 96). An example would be a woman bearing some-
one else’s child for money. She might feel very different about giving 
away the child after it has been born than at the moment when she 
signed the contract. Finally, there are extreme vulnerabilities in a mar-
ket whenever there are large inequalities in bargaining power between 
market participants. This could be because one party has much fewer 
resources – be they wealth or capabilities – than the other; or because 
the supplier has market power. A case of extreme vulnerability would 
be a destitute woman who prostitutes herself to survive.  
Using the Framework
Satz applies her framework in detail to five markets that people typi-
cally consider problematic: the market in surrogacy pregnancy, sex, child 
labor, voluntary slavery, and human kidneys. As Table 1 shows, these five 
markets set off all four of Satz’s alarm bells for noxious markets. In that 
respect, these markets are extreme. A market scoring highly on just one 
parameter of the framework could already be problematic. Satz notes as a 
limitation of her approach that she does not define precisely what scores 
on parameters would be sufficient to label a market ‘noxious’. This can 
lead to disagreements amongst users of her framework (Ibid.: 111). 
 Now, what to do if we agree that a market is noxious? Satz argues 
that a noxious market should not be banned automatically because the 
alternatives to banning the market might be worse. Forbidding child 
labor, for instance, could result in more child prostitution. Moreover, 
a change in regulation may already be sufficient to resolve the noxious-
ness of a market. A final reason for not banning problematic markets 
could be that banning is ineffective. Enforcing a ban on drugs, for 
example, is difficult. This could be a reason not to forbid a market in 
them.  
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Market Extremely harmful 
outcomes
Sources
Surrogacy
pregnancy
Society: perpetuates his-
torical status inequality 
between men and 
women 
Individual: possibly 
threatens security 
of child, surrogacy 
mother could be left in 
destitution if contract 
is cancelled
Weak agency: possible 
future emotional costs 
to surrogate mother; 
unborn child’s inte-
rests could be harmed
Vulnerability: desti-
tution/poverty
Prostitution Society: perpetuates his-
torical status inequality 
between men and 
women
Individual: basic 
agency interests of 
individual harmed 
(especially in the case 
of streetwalkers)
Weak agency: pimps 
decide
Vulnerability: destitu-
tion/poverty
Child Labor Society: less productive 
workforce due to lack 
of education; higher 
costs of public health-
care system; passive, 
ignorant citizenry
Individual: under-
mining of future 
well-being and 
capacities of child
Weak agency: a child 
cannot make well-
considered education 
decisions; unaware-
ness of parents about 
benefits of education
Vulnerability: desti-
tution/poverty
Market Extremely harmful 
outcomes
Sources
Voluntary slavery Society: perpetuation of 
social inequalities that 
hamper capitalism
Individual: extreme 
dependency on 
employer, inhibition 
to development of 
individual
Weak agency:  illiteracy 
and innumeracy 
Vulnerability: desti-
tution/poverty (no 
protection from 
seasonal fluctuations 
in income)
Kidney markets Society: worsening 
of existing class in-
equalities
Individual: potentially 
being forced to sell 
kidneys in case of 
destitution (kidneys 
could become col-
lateral)
Weak agency: un-
awareness of potential 
health consequences
Vulnerability: desti-
tution/poverty
Table 1: Satz’s assessment of noxious markets in Why Some Things Should 
Not Be For Sale 
3. The discriminatory power of the source parameters 
There are noxious markets that score high on only one or a few parameters 
of Satz’s framework. An interesting case is when a market just scores high on 
the source parameters, but has no extremely harmful outcomes. Weak agency 
and extreme vulnerability occur often and they do not always make a market 
morally objectionable – even when they occur in high degrees (see Satz, 2010: 
97; Claassen, 2012; Kachra, 2011). An important question is therefore: when 
is a market with only weak agency and/or extreme vulnerability noxious?
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 It is easily established that weak agency does not always make a market 
noxious. Consider the market in fast food. At least some consumers in this 
market will suffer from weak agency: they are not fully aware of the long-
term health risks of eating fast food or do not know about the range of other 
food options available. Still, not many people think of the fast food market 
as morally objectionable. The same goes for markets with extreme vulner-
abilities. Few people would deem a market in fruits with honest prices but 
some very poor buyers problematic. 
 In a review of Satz’s book, Claassen (2012: 590) claims that weak agency 
and extreme vulnerability only render a market noxious when they lead to 
extremely harmful outcomes. This would mean that the outcome parameters 
in Satz’s framework do all the discriminatory work. The source parameters 
would just be common causes of extremely harmful outcomes. We could 
leave them out of the framework and still label exactly the same markets 
‘noxious’. 
 This seems quite plausible at first glance. In all markets that Satz dis-
cusses in detail (see Table 1), weak agency and extreme vulnerability cause 
harmful outcomes. However, Satz does mention examples of cases where 
weak agency and extreme vulnerability make a market noxious even when 
there are no extremely harmful outcomes. For weak agency, she refers to 
markets that ‘target young children’, and markets ‘whose products are based 
on deception’ (2010: 97). For extreme vulnerability, she notes that markets 
in which people sell their assets at very low prices out of desperation are 
wrong, even if the sale does not result in extremely harmful outcomes (Ibid.). 
 Thus, Satz does mention that it is possible that markets are morally 
objectionable if there only is weak agency and/or extreme vulnerability. 
However, her framework does not seem to be developed to an extent that 
one can recognize such markets with it. Given that weak agency and extreme 
vulnerability occur often, it would be very helpful for discussions on the 
moral status of markets to have a better understanding of why they some-
times make markets noxious. 
4. Regulatory context matters
Regulation and the noxiousness of markets are closely intertwined. Frequently 
regulation can resolve the problems in a market (Ibid.: 104). It even seems to 
be the case that in absence of regulation, almost any market can be noxious 
(Fleurbaey, 2011).4  
 An example could help to see this more clearly: suppose cars were not 
invented yet.5  Then, someone - call her Pauline Daimler - invents them. Many 
people will be shocked by the thought of cars: collisions can result in death 
(extremely harmful outcomes to individuals), drivers are largely dependent for 
their safety on other drivers whose capacities for driving they cannot establish 
(weak agency), and poorer car owners cannot afford the safer, heavier cars of the 
rich (vulnerability). 
 Without regulation, it seems that Satz would have to label a market in cars 
‘noxious’. With regulation, this is no longer the case. If there are clear traffic 
rules enforced by the police, a minimal safety standard for cars, and obligatory 
courses to ensure that drivers know the traffic rules and are capable of maneu-
vering their vehicles safely, the car market would not score so high on Satz’s 
framework anymore. Regulation can make the difference between a market 
being noxious or not. This does not mean that regulation is a panacea for the 
noxiousness of markets, however. Some markets are problematic by their very 
nature. The already mentioned advertisement targeted at children would be an 
example.  
 Now, what to do with the knowledge that regulation and the moral status 
of markets are closely intertwined? When Satz applies her framework to mar-
kets in the third part of her book, she always asks two questions. First: is this 
market morally objectionable? And only when a market is found to be noxious: 
can regulation resolve its noxiousness? This strategy works well for markets that 
exist in reality, because then a regulatory context is already present. 
 However, many of the markets Satz considers are merely theoretical. There 
are, for instance, no nationwide markets in surrogacy motherhood or human 
kidneys (except for Iran in the latter case). Asking whether these markets are 
noxious before thinking about a regulatory framework for them seems to be 
unproductive. After all, even the market in cars and food could be noxious in 
absence of regulation.  
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5. Actual outcomes are surer than expected ones
A related worry is that it is very difficult to know what a theoretical market 
will be like when actualized. If one is unsure about how a market will turn 
out in reality, how can the market’s moral status be assessed? 
 This question ties in with a classic problem in ethics. There is a debate 
in consequentialism on how moral knowledge – knowledge of whether an 
action is right or wrong – can be obtained (Shafer-Landau, 2010: 120). The 
central question is: how should we assess the moral status of an action when 
not all of its results have occurred yet? 
 Two answers are relevant here.6  Either you cannot tell, because the right-
ness of an action depends on its actual results. Or you can guess, because the 
rightness of an action can be inferred from its expected results. The main 
drawback of the first answer is that you do not have moral knowledge in 
cases where not all the results of an action have occurred yet. The main 
drawback of the second answer is that your expectations could turn out to 
be wrong. 
 A simple example can be of help here. Suppose you think that, in theory, 
there might be a risk that surrogacy motherhood would reinforce negative 
gender stereotypes. If you think that you cannot acquire moral knowledge 
without actual results, the only way to decide whether a market in surrogacy 
pregnancy would indeed reinforce negative gender stereotypes is to try this 
market. If you can base your judgment on expected outcomes, on the other 
hand, this would not be required. 
 In a review of Satz’s (2010) book, Steiner (2013) argues that there 
is too large a possibility of making wrong judgments about markets that 
only exist in theory. According to him, one simply has to accept that it 
is impossible to assess the moral status of theoretical markets. I think 
such a strict stance would be a loss. It is as likely for theoretical markets 
to require moral assessments as it is for actual markets. Consider the 
privatization of public transport, electricity supply, and postal services 
during recent decades in many Western European countries. Moreover, 
if a market always has to be tried before it could be forbidden, much 
harm might occur that could have been anticipated.  
 It is good to be aware, however, that there always is a risk of having 
wrong expectations about how a market will turn out in reality. This means 
that the user of Satz’s framework needs to consider any available empirical 
evidence on the markets assessed. Sometimes there is a lack of such attention 
to empirical studies in Satz’s book. 
 For starters, Satz argues that prostitution is noxious inter alia 
because it reinforces negative gender stereotypes, according to which 
women are ‘objects for male use’ (Ibid.: 149). She does not, how-
ever, try to establish whether this is indeed what happens in countries 
such as Argentina, Germany, the Netherlands, Mexico and the United 
Kingdom, where prostitution is legal in varying degrees (Global News 
and The Canadian Press, 2013). Similarly, in her discussion of the 
potential noxiousness of a market in human kidneys, Satz does not 
consider the various empirical studies done on the kidney market in 
Iran – she just mentions in a footnote that Iran is the only country in 
the world with a legal market in kidneys (Ibid.: 233). Such empirical 
studies would give her some actual results with which she can contrast 
her expectations. 
6. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to assess to what extent Satz’s framework can 
be used as a guideline for discussions on the moral status of markets. As 
Satz demonstrates in her book, the framework is successful in the sense 
that many markets we think of as problematic also score highly on one or 
more of its parameters. Nevertheless, I have argued in this paper that some 
further elaboration of the framework and how to use it would be helpful 
on three issues. 
 First of all, some markets are noxious just because they score high on the 
source parameters of Satz’s framework. Such cases are interesting, because 
weak agency and extreme vulnerability occur often and do not always render 
a market noxious. Consequently, it would be desirable to have a criterion 
that tells us when weak agency and extreme vulnerability are problematic 
and when they are not. 
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 Also, almost any market could be noxious without regulation. When 
considering theoretical markets, it is therefore unproductive to first ask 
whether the market is noxious and only afterwards whether this noxiousness 
can be resolved through regulation. Even the commonplace markets in food 
and cars would be problematic without regulation. 
 Lastly, when assessing the moral status of a market, it is important to 
consider its actual outcomes as much as possible. There are many ways in 
which a market might turn out differently in reality from how it looks on 
paper. To avoid making erroneous assessments of markets, it is therefore 
important to consider all available empirical evidence. 
 Any guide for discussion is incomplete by definition. This also goes for 
Satz’s guide for moral reflection on markets. The purpose of this paper was 
to point at some details where further elaboration of her framework would 
facilitate discussions on the moral status of markets even more. The devil is 
always in the details; it is good to know where it is hiding. 
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Notes
1. Satz (2010: 200) refers to a study by anthropologist Lawrence Cohen, in which he notes 
that kidneys – especially those of women – are already used as debt collateral in certain 
regions of India.
2. For a summary of Satz’s critique of general egalitarians and specific egalitarians, see 
Claassen’s (2012) review of her book.
3. Adam Smith already pointed this out in his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations (1776/1904). He writes that factory work can make workers as ‘stupid 
and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become’ (Ibid.: V.1.178).
 4. Satz (2010: 99) acknowledges this, but then does not apply it in her discussion of spe-
cific markets in the third part of her book. 
5. Fleurbaey (2011) mentions the food market as an example of a market that would score 
high on multiple parameters in Satz’ framework absent regulation.  
6. I ignore ‘proximate consequentialism’, which uses the legal notion of proximate causes 
to determine the moral status of actions (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2012). It seems relevant to 
neither Satz’ nor Steiner’s position.  
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